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Resumo
Este artigo analisa aspectos da judicialização da política 
de saúde no Brasil. Discute-se a questão no contexto da 
separação dos poderes do Estado, a tutela judicial do 
direito público à saúde, as denominadas “discriciona-
riedades administrativas técnicas” e, finalmente, a ne-
cessidade de lastro orçamentário para conferir eficácia 
às decisões dos tribunais. Para aprofundar a análise do 
tratamento que o Brasil empresta à judicialização da polí-
tica, este artigo também compara a experiência brasileira 
com a experiência de outros países que vivem o mesmo 
fenômeno.
Palavras-chave: Direito brasileiro; direito à saúde; judi-
cialização da política de saúde; tripartição dos poderes 
do Estado; discricionariedade administrativa técnica; 
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Abstract
This paper considers aspects of the judicialization of health 
care policy in Brazil. It discusses the issue in the context of 
the separation of the powers of government, judicial pro-
tection of the public right to healthcare, the so-called “tech-
nical administrative discretionary prerogatives,” and finally, 
the need for a budget to provide for the efficacy of court 
decisions. To further the analysis of Brazil’s treatment of the 
judicialization of politics this paper also compares Brazil’s 
experience with the experience of other countries witness-
ing the same phenomenon.
Keywords: Brazilian Law; right to healthcare; judicializa-
tion of healthcare policy; three branches of government; 
technical discretionary prerogative; equality before the law; 
government budget.
 
Como citar este artigo | How to cite this article: PERLINGEIRO, Ricardo. Recognizing the public right to healthcare: the approach 
of Brazilian courts. Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 1, n. 1, p. 19-37, jan./abr. 2014. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.5380/rinc.v1i1.40246
* Adaptation of Perlingeiro R. The increased judicial in public healthcare in a comparative Franco-Brazilian perspective [unpu-
blished lecture notes]. Fluminese Federal University; notes provided at lecture given on 2010 August 30-31. This article was 
originally published in Portuguese in Review “Direito, Estado e Sociedade”, v. 41, p. 184-203, 2012, and in English in Review 
“Revista Portuguesa de Saúde Pública”, v.32, p.10.1016/j.rpsp, 2014. The author is indebted to Carlos André Galante Grover, J.D. 
candidate at American University, Washington College of Law, for his invaluable assistance in reviewing this article and research 
on the United States’ experience of the judicialization of healthcare.
** Full Professor at the Law School of Fluminense Federal University (UFF – Rio de Janeiro-RJ) and coordinator of the Judiciary 
Sciences Centre at UFF (Nupej/UFF). Doctorate in Law – University Gama Filho (UGF). Coordinator of the Executive Committee of 
the National Council of Justice for the monitoring and settlement of healthcare assistance claims in the State of Rio de Janeiro. 
Member of the Brazilian Institute of Procedural Law. Member of Ibero-American Institute of Procedural Law. Member of the 
International Association of Procedural Law. Federal judge of the Judiciary Section of Rio de Janeiro.
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 1, n. 1, p. 19-37, jan./abr. 2014.
Ricardo Perlingeiro
20 
CONTENTS
1. Should the Judiciary get involved in making Government health policy?. 2. Does the Judiciary have 
the expertise to interfere with the healthcare policymaking?. 3. Can the Judiciary protect an individual’s 
public healthcare rights without considering other individuals in the same situation?. 4. The relevance 
of finite resources to the court’s role in resolving access to healthcare cases?. 5. Final considerations. 
6. References.
In Brazil, the topic of the “judicialization of healthcare policy” continues foment-
ing debates in the three branches of power and naturally provokes interest of judges’ 
academies and schools.1 The recent National Council of Justice (CNJ) Recommendation 
no. 31, of 30 March 2010, on healthcare assistance, and CNJ Resolution no. 107, of 6 
April 2010, that establishes the National Judiciary Forum for the monitoring and settle-
ment of healthcare assistance claims is clear evidence of the importance and timeliness 
of the subject in Brazilian society.2 The current significance of the topic of judicializa-
tion of healthcare policy is manifested in the joint academic pursuit undertaken by the 
Fluminense Federal University, Judiciary Sciences Centre, Nupej, and University of Paris 
Descartes, Institute of Health and Law, IDS. Federal Senate Bill no. 338, of 2007, further 
evidences the primacy of the topic by amending law no. 8.80/1990 that deals with the 
1  NOBRE, Milton. The installation of the Fórum Nacional do Judiciário (National Forum for Judicial) monito-
ring and resolution of the demands of health care [published speech]. Conselho Nacional de Justiça (National 
Justice Council); speech given on 2010 August 3. Retrieved from: <http://www.cnj.jus.br/portal/images/pro-
gramas/forumdasaude/discurso_cons_milton.pdf>. (stating “people speak of the ‘judicialization of healthcare 
policy,’ as though referring to a distortion that needs to be combatted like an epidemic of judicial actions, whe-
reas the constant observation of reality, according to the essential methodological attitude in any scientific 
field shows exactly the opposite to be true. In many cases, calling upon the judiciary is the only efficacious re-
medy that is actually available to society for confronting certain dysfunctions and insufficiencies of the system. 
These insufficiencies and dysfunctions are derived from, and this is the real cause to be eliminated, the lack of 
clear rules concerning the rights and obligations of each of the participants, as well as their responsibilities and 
limitations.”). Brazil is a federal republic made up of federal, state, and municipal levels of governance.
2  BRAZIL. National Justice Council Recommendation no. 31 of 2010 [statute on the Internet]. Access on 2013, 
March 3. Retrieved from: <http://www.cnj.jus.br/atos-administrativos/atos-da-presidencia/322-recomenda-
coes-do-conselho/12113-recomendacao-no-31-de-30-de-marco-de-2010> (holding healthcare study and 
mobilization seminars, bringing together judges, members of the public prosecutor’s office and managers, 
in order to promote better networking in the subject area, with the objective of obtaining technical support 
from medical doctors and pharmacologists to help the judges form a judgment of high quality in terms of 
their evaluation of the clinical questions presented by the litigants; promoting visits by the judges to the Sta-
te and Municipal Healthcare Councils, to public healthcare units and the accredited units of the SUS (single 
healthcare system) in order to gain practical knowledge of how they work); BRAZIL. National Justice Council 
Resolution no. 107 of 2010 [statute on the Internet]. Retrieved from: <http://www.cnj.jus.br/atos-administra-
tivos/atos-da-presidencia/323-resolucoes/12225-resolucao-no-107-de-06-de-abril-de-2010>. Access on 2013, 
March 13.  (proposing specific normative measures aimed at optimizing procedural routines, organizing and 
structuring specialized judicial units, and normative measures to prevent judicial conflicts and to define stra-
tegies in healthcare law, Including legislation on healthcare as an independent subject in the Administrative 
Justice program for the corresponding judges’ entrance exam, in accordance with the list of minimum required 
subjects established by CNJ by-law no 650/2009 - <http://www.cnj.jus.br/atos-administrativos/11896:portaria-
-n-650-de-20-de-novembro-de-2009>).
Recognizing the public right to healthcare: the approach of Brazilian courts
21Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 1, n. 1, p. 19-37, jan./abr. 2014.
supply of therapeutic procedures and distribution of medication by the Sistema Único 
de Saúde (Single Healthcare System). 3 
The judicialization of healthcare policy is not unique to Brazil. It is also found in 
a limited degree in the United States and to the same extent as in Brazil in other Latin 
American countries such as Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Mexico.4
Strictly on the procedural level, the expression “judicialization of healthcare pol-
icy” is present whenever Government acts or omission give rise to legal action, brought 
against a public healthcare authority regarding healthcare policy, that asserts the right 
to protection of healthcare in light of unconstitutionality or violation of current legis-
lation.5
3  BRAZIL. Senate Bill no. 338 of 2007 [statute on the Internet]. Retrieved from: <http://www.senado.gov.br/
atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_cod_mate=81517>. Access on 2013, March 3; Law 12.401 of 2011; Retrieved 
from: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2011-2014/2011/Lei/L12401>.htm (stating “the importance 
of the subject matter of this report and the need to find solutions that safeguard the right to universal and 
egalitarian access to actions and services for health promotion, protection and recovery, as stipulated by Arti-
cle 196 of the Federal Constitution, led the healthcare managers, the Judiciary Power, the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office and representative segments of civil society to promote (in recent years) various debates about the 
increased role of the judiciary in examining public healthcare policies. In April 2009, the Federal Supreme Court 
held a Public Hearing in order to prepare an assessment of the actions subject to its judgment, in which 5 out 
6 of the planned topics were directly related to the ‘judicialization of healthcare policy’ in the context of the 
single healthcare system (SUS)”).
4  MANNING, S.; RADAZZO, K. Leveling the Playing Field? Litigant Success Rates in Healthcare Policy Cases in 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The Justice System Journal, v. 30, n. 2, 2009. p. 247 (discussing increased litigation 
over termination of health benifits since Goldberg v. Kelly); CHILE. Constitutional Court Judgment No. 976-
07 of 2008; COLOMBIA. Constitutional Court Judgment no. T-760 of 2008 [statute on the Internet]. Retrieved 
from:  <http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2008/T-760-08.htm>. Access on 2013, March 3; AR-
GENTINA. Buenos Aires National Supreme Court, Recurso de Hecho Law B. 537. XLIV 2010; URUGUAY. Court 
of Appeals in Civil Matters, 2nd Judicial Rotation, Judgment no. 159/2008; URUGUAY. Court for Administrative 
Litigation, 3rd Judicial Rotation, Action for Amparo (constitutional relief ) IUE 2-27081/2009; URUGUAY. Court 
of Appeals in Civil Matters, 5th Judicial Rotation, Judgment no. 94/2012.
5  Article 196 of the CRFB/1988 [statute on the Internet]. Retrieved from: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/
constituicao/constituicao.htm>. Access on 2013, March 3. (inferring healthcare is considered a subjective pu-
blic right from language that states, “everyone is entitled to healthcare, which is a duty of the State, guaranteed 
by social and economic policies intended to reduce the risk of illness and other grievances and to ensure uni-
versal and egalitarian access to actions and services for health promotion, protection and recovery.”); BRAZIL. 
Federal Supreme Court, STA 175 AgR/CE, DJ-e 76, p. 70, 30 April 2010; German Federal Constitutional Court. 
Guiding Principle of the Decision of the First Senate (Leitsatz zum Beschluss des Ersten Senats), 1 BvR 347/98 of 
2005.  Retrieved from: <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20051206_1bvr034798.
html>. It should be noted that judicial review by the Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF) occurs on both a diffuse 
and abstract basis. Much like the United States’ system of diffuse review, lower courts of general jurisdiction 
can deal with constitutional questions while the STF exercises appellate jurisdiction over these concrete ca-
ses and controversies. Additionally, Direct actions challenging constitutionality in the abstract (i.e. without a 
specific cases or controversy) can be brought by a certain government and non-governmental individuals and 
entities specified by the Constitution. The exercise of abstract review requires a quorum of eight (of eleven) 
justices, and six votes are required to declare an act unconstitutional. Decisions in direct action abstract review 
are binding erga omnes. KRITZER, Herbert M. (editor). The Legal Systems of the World: A Political, Social, and 
Cultural Encyclopedia. Denver: Oxford, 2002. 
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A typical example of the judicialization of healthcare policy in Brazilian courts 
arises when actions are filed, individually or collectively, against a Public Healthcare Au-
thority for the supply of medicines not incorporated into the SUS. In fact, although the 
SUS is a universal, egalitarian, free and comprehensive system, certain medical treat-
ments and products may not be made available to the general public. This lack of avail-
ability can be attributed generally to either of the following two situations: 1) the lack 
of public healthcare policies (laws, rules or administrative proceedings) that support or 
coincide with the patient’s claims; or 2) the Public Healthcare Authority’s failure to com-
ply with the existing policies, often due to the lack of a clear definition of the division 
of authority among federal entities. Strictly speaking, the judicialization of healthcare 
policy is found only in the first situation, in which healthcare policies are lacking and 
the existing policies somehow frustrate the citizens’ demands for medication necessary 
to protect their health.6
To ensure adequate examination of the procedural aspects of the judicializa-
tion of healthcare policy, especially from a comparative perspective, this study will 
be limited to court cases related to healthcare policies established by administrative 
acts or rules. That is to say, this study will focus on procedural law in cases relevant to 
public healthcare authorities, known in Brazil as “public procedural law”, in the United 
States as a subset of administrative law concerned with “administrative procedure,” and 
in Europe and the rest of Latin America as “administrative jurisdiction” or “administra-
tive justice.”7 The scope of this analysis does not include judicial protection extended 
to healthcare policies derived directly from law, since such protection depends more 
on the principles of constitutional jurisdiction. Additionally, and most importantly, this 
study will not focus on judicial protection derived directly from law because the ma-
jority of the litigation over public healthcare rights in Brazil do not involve question of 
constitutionality – whether by act or omission– of healthcare laws.8
6  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court, STA 175, 17 Mar. 2010; Public Hearing 4 (judicial disputes on the subject 
of “healthcare law” mainly arise from  the Public Healthcare Authority (SUS) denying a request because the 
requested medicine is not registered, an administrative decision of the Anvisa refusing to register a health-
care product (including drugs that are purely experimental or whose efficacy have not been demonstrated 
scientifically). The SUS failing to regularly provide the healthcare action (medicine or treatment) even though 
it is registered with the Anvisa: (a) administrative decision based on the lack of scientific evidence for the re-
quested healthcare treatment or product – an alternative treatment is proposed (but not found suitable by 
the claimant); (b) decision based on the lack of scientific evidence for the requested healthcare treatment or 
product– without any specific treatment for the claimant’s pathology; (c) administrative decision justifying 
treatment based on new healthcare products or treatments – not tested by the SUS (not included in the test 
protocols); 3. The Public Healthcare Authority (SUS) regularly supplies the healthcare product (requested me-
dicine or treatment), but in a certain specific case rightly denies the claimant’s request: administrative decision 
based on the unsuitability of the healthcare product or treatment for the claimant.
7  BUENO, C. S.; SUNDFELD, C.A. Direito Processual Público (Public Procedural Law) São Paulo: Malheiros, 2000; 
BURNHAM, W. Introduction to the Law and Legal Systems of the United States. 4.ed. St. Paul: West, 2001.
8  Public Hearing 4, initiated by the Federal Supreme Court in STA 175: (stating “after hearing the testimony 
of the representatives of the various sectors involved, I think it is necessary to rethink the question of the 
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Is it necessary to require specific judicial protection for the public right to health-
care protection? Is there a need for specialized public healthcare courts and procedural 
rules based on the German model with its social law jurisdiction and procedural legis-
lation?9 Is it not enough to have the existing courts and procedural rules applicable to 
public disputes in general, as is the case in both Brazil and the United States?
Answers to these questions can be pursued by examining the procedural ques-
tions the Government most often raises in court. The arguments are mainly based on 
the juxtaposition of individual disputes involving the right to healthcare protection, on 
the one hand, and the duties of the general public, on the other. In the same vein, it will 
be helpful to examine the basic principles of jurisdiction of the courts over administra-
tive authorities, which, in the healthcare cases, should also be guided by the concept of 
effective judicial protection.
1. SHOULD THE JUDICIARY GET INVOLVED IN 
MAKING GOVERNMENT HEALTH POLICY?
As one example of the abundant Brazilian case law on the subject, it is worth 
mentioning the case of a patient with physical impairments who asked to be supplied 
an orthotic device necessary for the treatment of a post-polio disorder. The Public 
Healthcare Authority, in one of its defenses, alleged that there was no obligation to 
supply a medical device not included in a standardized list in official programs. Their 
argument was as follows:
The Judiciary, hearing a request for medication, implies an infringement of Art. 2 of the Con-
stitution (“The Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial, independent and harmonious 
among themselves, are the powers of the Union”) to the extent that it (the Judiciary) would 
‘judicialization’ of healthcare law in Brazil. This is so because in the majority of cases judicial intervention is 
not motivated by an absolute omission in the public healthcare policies intended to safeguard the right to 
healthcare but rather by the need for a judicial determination for the enforcement of policies that already exist. 
Thus, there is no problem of judicial interference with the free evaluations or margin of discretion enjoyed by 
the other branches of government with respect to the formulation of public policies. That fact may be relevant 
when establishing a criterion or parameter to decide cases like this one, in which the debates primarily concern 
the interference of the Judiciary Branch in the sphere of the other Branches.”). 
9  Sozialgerichtsgesetz. Retrieved from: <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/sgg/index.html>; Zehntes Buch 
Sozialgesetzbuch - Sozialverwaltungsverfahren und Sozialdatenschutz - (SGB X). Retrieved from: <http://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/sgb_10/index.html>; BUSTILLOS, L. O. Introducción a los Fundamentos del Derecho 
Procesal Social en Alemania: Jurisdicción y Seguridad Social (Introduction to the basics of social procedural 
law in Germany: jurisdiction and social security). Niterói, Brazil: Seminário sobre Estado de Direito (Seminar 
on the Rule of Law), 2010 (noting “in Germany, there has been a discussion since 2004 about the possibility of 
uniting the jurisdictions of public law, i.e., combining the special financial, social and administrative jurisdic-
tions into a single jurisdiction of public law. Rather than being motivated by problems inherent in the nature of 
the jurisdiction, however, such efforts at reform through unification are based on pragmatic considerations in 
order to solve the problem of the saturation of judges in one jurisdiction and enable their transfer to another 
jurisdiction.”). 
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be exercising a function specifically designated to the Executive, by redirecting resources from 
the specific public policies in existence to an individual case, regardless of the seriousness of 
the case.10 
Still, the court decided that:
since healthcare is a social right, it should be taken care of by the state, through public poli-
cies, especially the SUS (Single Healthcare System). According to the Constitution of 1988, such 
public policies constitute a set of governmental actions. It is therefore a right of an eminently 
constitutional nature, whose obligatory provider (of the right) must be the state, which has 
the duty of developing the necessary programs so that, together, the three public entities 
(branches of government) will achieve the higher purpose, which is giving effect to that right. 
Thus, for the primary purpose of ensuring the effectiveness of that right, the Federal Constitu-
tion distributes to the (Brazilian) Union, the States, the Federal District and Municipalities the 
responsibility for such actions and services.11
In another request to be supplied a portable insulin pump and all the acces-
sories necessary for its use, the administrative authorities once again argued that the 
request offended the principle of the separation of powers, alleging that “it is the Ex-
ecutive that has the authority to delineate public policies and define which medica-
tions will be supplied gratuitously to the public, by weighing the rights of the individual 
against those of the rest of the community, given the need to comply with the principle 
that the individual must not demand the impossible of the state.”12 Nevertheless, more 
than once, the court has decided in the patient’s favor: 
a Democratic state governed by the Rule of Law inherently offers the possibility of judicial 
review of administrative acts; the Federal Supreme Court itself has increasingly recognized 
the possibility of judicial questioning of the State’s refusal to supply various pharmaceuticals 
listed in the Clinical Protocols of the SUS, for the treatment of certain illnesses.13
The role of the Judiciary in determining that public policies established by ad-
ministrative and infra-legal measures need to be edited or revised must be tempered 
by the principles that guide judicial protection of citizens against administrative au-
thorities.14 To this end, the Euro-American Code stipulates that the scope and intensity 
of judicial supervision should be as follows:
10  BRAZIL. Federal Regional Court of the 4th Region, no. 0001647 (04.2008.404.7210/SC), 2010, Mar. 3.
11  BRAZIL. Federal Regional Court of the 4th Region, no. 0001647 (04.2008.404.7210/SC), 2010, Mar. 3.
12  BRAZIL. Federal Regional Court of the 4th Region, no. 0001647 (04.2008.404.7210/SC), 2010, Mar. 3.
13  BRAZIL. Federal Regional Court of the 4a Região, no. 200.04.043511-1/PR, 2010, Feb. 11 (appeal for review).
14  GRINOVER, A. P. O Controle Jurisdicional de Políticas Públicas. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2011 (being stu-
died for the purpose of regulating judicial procedure for public policy control); BLANKE, H. J. Margenes de 
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The mission of the Judiciary in the administrative jurisdiction is to uphold the Rule of Law, 
supervise the legality of administrative proceedings, and to protect and enforce rights and 
legitimate interests.
To this end, the administrative jurisdiction rules on the following claims, in particular: (a) the 
annulment of administrative acts or norms; (b) mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, in-
cluding enacting administrative acts or norms; (c) orders to hand over a certain thing. 
The Judiciary must examine the legality of the administrative authority’s acts or omissions. 
Review of legality encompasses errors of jurisdiction, procedure and form (formal or external 
legality) as well as errors of content (substantive or internal legality). Review of content refers 
to examining the legal grounds of the individual act [questions of law], factual determina-
tions [questions of fact], and legal classification of the events [mixed questions of law and 
fact]. [The court also] verifies whether the administrative authority has abused its power. Even 
when the administrative authority has applied ill-defined legal concepts, the court may exam-
ine whether they have been correctly interpreted and applied. 
Regarding the review of discretionary powers, it is the duty of the Judiciary to examine in par-
ticular: (a) whether the administrative authority’s act or omission exceeded the limits of its 
discretionary powers; (b) whether the proceedings were suited to the purpose established in 
the regulation granting the powers; (c) whether there were actually infringements of funda-
mental rights or principles, such as equality, proportionality, good faith, protection of legiti-
mate expectations, and prohibition of arbitrary action. The Judiciary also reviews the failure 
to exercise a discretionary power.15
Discricionalidad y de Apreciación. Buenos Aires: Fundacion Konrad Adenauer, 2012; ABERASTURY, Pedro. La 
justicia administrativa. Buenos Aires: Lexis, 2006; (noting, in regards to German law, “according to the case 
law of the Federal Administrative Supreme Court, an ill-defined concept of law is fully reviewable and only 
in special cases does the Public Authority have the last word in decision-making in configurations involving 
a margin of discretion. For the purpose of reviewing examination decisions (in schools, universities, etc.) the 
Federal Constitutional Court has further expanded the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts, declaring that 
the supervision of arbitrary rulings by the Public Authority must be supplemented by supervision of the ‘jus-
tifiability’ of administrative decisions. Another category of cases in which the Public Authority has a margin of 
discretion involves administrative decisions of a predictive nature, in case of a risk to the public, or planning 
decisions, especially in environmental law, genetic engineering and economic law with respect to the Nuclear 
Power Plant Construction Act. The basic idea here is that it is necessary to comply with the special responsibi-
lity of the executive authorities when it comes to evaluating risks. That argument is contradictory, at the very 
least, for the simple reason that, just as the Public Authority, the administrative courts may consult experts. 
However, even in cases involving a margin of discretion, the courts are acknowledged to have the authority 
to supervise the Public Authority’s decisions. Against that backdrop, orienting itself according to Art. 114 of 
the Code of Administrative Justice), the court examines whether the Public Authority of civil service career 
candidates.”).
15  Text prepared in three Euro-American research seminars “Model Administrative Jurisdiction Code”, held by 
the Research Group “Effectiveness of Jurisdiction” in Fluminense Federal University, Niterói (Brazil), and at the 
German University of Administrative Sciences, Speyer (Germany), between the years 2008 and 2010; appro-
ved in the 3rd Seminar held in September 2010 in Niterói. The authors of the code were Pedro Aberastury, 
Hermann-Josef Blanke, Gabriele Bottino, David Capitant, Jesús María Casal, Diana-Urania Galleta, Ricardo Gar-
cia Macho, Leonardo Greco, Lorena Ossio, Gilles Pellissier, Ricardo Perlingeiro Mendes da Silva, and Karl-Peter 
Sommermann.
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The above-cited stipulations would be no different if the content of the disput-
ed administrative acts relate to public healthcare. This is true except with respect to 
the technical aspects that might require the Judiciary to have special qualifications to 
ensure the quality of the judicial supervision, as will be mentioned below.
Thus, the Judiciary does not go beyond its institutional functions to ensure ef-
fectiveness of the right to healthcare when it exercises judicial review over healthcare 
policies, because the right to healthcare is a fundamental right in Brazilian case law.16 
For this reason, the Judiciary involves itself in the healthcare policies otherwise subject 
to administrative acts and standards. That power of judicial review is not limited to re-
pairing the harm caused by an erroneous policy, but also includes the review of policies 
and orders to revise the corresponding administrative acts or rules.17
2. DOES THE JUDICIARY HAVE THE EXPERTISE TO 
INTERFERE WITH THE HEALTHCARE POLICYMAKING?
As already noted, the National Council of Justice (CNJ) Resolution no. 107 estab-
lished the National Judiciary Forum to monitor and settle healthcare assistance claims. 
According to Article 2 of that resolution, one of the objectives of the National Forum 
is to “propose concrete normative measures to organize and structure specialized judi-
cial units.”18 That proposal supports the need for the courts to promote judge’s visits to 
the healthcare units and for judgeship schools to promote courses and events on that 
subject.19
In fact, the constant specialization of the courts is an inherent measure of the 
quality of judicial performance and therefore of the principle of effective judicial pro-
tection. It is assumed that the judges are best suited to answer the specialized ques-
tions repeatedly referred to them, since that enables them to gain in-depth knowledge 
and reduce the margin of error.
16  BRAZIL. Federal Supreme Court, Decision STA 175, 2010, 17 March. Retrieved from: <http://redir.stf.jus.br/
paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=AC&docID=610255>.
17  BRAZIL. Higher Court of Justice, AgRg no REsp. no 1.136.549/RS, 2009/0076691-2, 2010, June 21. Re-
trieved from: <http://www.stj.jus.br/webstj/processo/Justica/detalhe.asp?numreg=200900766912&p-
v=010000000000&tp=51> (deciding “since social rights must not be dependent on the good will of the admi-
nistrator, it is of fundamental importance that the Judiciary act as the supervisor of administrative activities. It 
would be twisted to think that the principle of the separation of powers, originally conceived for the purpose 
of guaranteeing fundamental rights, might be used to interfere with the assertion of fundamental social rights 
[...]. The correct interpretation of the principle of separation of powers in public policies is that the Judiciary’s 
activities should be limited only when the Public Healthcare Authority acts within the limits permitted by law.”). 
18  BRAZIL. National Justice Council Recommendation no. 31 of 2010 [statute on the Internet]. Retrieved 
from: <http://www.cnj.jus.br/atos-administrativos/atos-da-presidencia/322-recomendacoes-do-conselho/
12113-recomendacao-no-31-de-30-de-marco-de-2010>. Access on 2013, March 3.
19  BRAZIL. National Justice Council Recommendation no. 31of 2010 [statute on the Internet]. Retrieved 
from: <http://www.cnj.jus.br/atos-administrativos/atos-da-presidencia/322-recomendacoes-do-conselho/
12113-recomendacao-no-31-de-30-de-marco-de-2010>. Access on 2013, March 3.
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The specialization of judicial bodies in the subject area of healthcare would, 
however, entail fractionalization of judges and bodies with jurisdiction solely over pub-
lic healthcare law. In Brazil, there are no judicial bodies specializing in health or public 
healthcare.20 Certain noteworthy examples of specialized judicial bodies may, however, 
be found in Europe. In England, for example, the Mental Health Review Tribunal makes 
decision on compulsory detention in mental health facilities for treatment purposes.21 
In France, the law of the 4th of March, 2002 (Loi Kouchner) and the law of the 9th of March, 
2004 (Loi Perben II) have created certain courts specializing in public healthcare.22 In 
Germany, it is worth mentioning the example of the “special healthcare senates” within 
the social rights courts, as shown by the Code of Judicial Procedural of Social Law.23
Moreover, the possibility of judicial review of administrative technique ques-
tions – also known as “margin of discretion in technical matters”– in the field of public 
healthcare is inherent to the right to effective judicial protection. In addition to the 
specialized legal aspects of healthcare law, there is increasing demand for a court with 
scientific and technical expertise in healthcare and healthcare management in order to 
decide such cases.
However, in a system such as Brazil’s, in which judges are necessarily educated 
in the law, such technical knowledge is derived from court appointed expert opinions. 
The role of the judge is at risk of becoming secondary or dependent in that respect.24 
20  In the capital city of the State of Rio de Janeiro, the Lower Treasury Courts adopted a procedure in which civil 
servants in the field of healthcare (who are employed by the Public Authority) prepare, within the court’s own 
offices, a technical report on the legal actions initiated and submit it immediately to the judges, who examine 
the report before performing any judicial acts. That system reduces the number of disputes by preventing the 
continuation of existing spurious disputes and discouraging new ones, because the judge is promptly suppor-
ted by an official opinion on the claim presented. In substance, however, that procedure is sui generis and is not 
comparable with a court that has a panel of multidisciplinary judges, since the opinions are drafted by the chal-
lenged Public Authority itself. On the one hand, it is intended to make up for the lack of a prior hearing of both 
parties when granting the precautionary measures “inaudita altera pars”, which are common in proceedings 
concerning healthcare; on the other, it is intended to make up for a gap in the Brazilian legal system which, 
failing to distinguish between a prior administrative dispute and a prior administrative complaint, requires the 
absence of such measures as a prerequisite for filing a judicial action. 
21  BRADLEY, A. W.; EWING, K. D. Constitutional and Administrative Law. 14.ed. London: Longman; 2007.
22  Law no. 2002-303 of 4 March 2002 (The Kouchner Act) (written on the rights of patients and the quality of 
the healthcare system and added provisions to the Public Health Code that created three specialized centers 
in Paris, Lyon and Marseilles for criminal law issues in the healthcare sector. In France, there are other courts 
specializing in healthcare, such as the inter-regional courts of social and healthcare pricing – that have jurisdic-
tion over disputes related to reimbursement “by installments” in the daily prices and the prices of other heal-
thcare, social or socio-medical public services (L. 6143-4 CSP, which instituted five competent courts in France: 
in Bordeaux, Lyon, Nancy, Nantes and Paris) and the courts of technical reviews that exercise jurisdiction over 
malpractice, abuses, fraud and other offences committed by medical doctors, surgeons, dentists, “midwives”, 
pharmacists and medical assistants when treatment is given or services are provided to social security bene-
ficiaries.”).
23  Sozialgerichtsgesetz, § 10, 2 [statute available on the Internet].Retrieved from: <http://www.gesetze-im-in-
ternet.de/bundesrecht/sgg/gesamt.pdf>. Access on 2010, December 31.
24  TARUFFO, M. Sobre las Fronteras, Escritos Sobre la Justicia Civil (On the Borders, Writings on Civil Jus-
tice). Bogota: Temis, 2006. (enumerating important, hard-to-solve problems in the use of scientific proof, by 
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Would the judge be the hostage of the experts? This question generates a certain dis-
comfort and justifies the National Council of Justice’s recommendation that courts seek 
alternative means of raising judge’s level of medical expertise, through specific judge 
training programs, including, for example, visits to public healthcare establishments 
and events that bring together judges and healthcare managers.25  
The United States presents an interesting response to the concern that expert 
testimony in cases turning on technical questions may reduce the trier of fact’s role to a 
secondary capacity. In the United States both parties to a proceeding find, prepare, and 
present their own expert testimony. Court-appointed experts are possible, but rare.26 
The trier of fact, often a jury in the United States’ system, makes a determination based 
on the trier of fact’s evaluation of the competing testimony. This approach is based on 
the idea that there are often conflicting perspectives on technical questions and that 
the trier of fact should be presented with those divergent perspectives before making 
a determination.27 While the trier of fact, whether a judge or a jury, makes credibility 
determinations, the issue of admissibility of expert testimony is a question of law and 
is determined by the judge pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702.28 FRE 702 
states that a court may allow an expert to testify when: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) “the testimony is based on 
calling attention to the “judge’s capacity to actually function as a peritus peritorum (expert among experts) on 
occasions on which he is called upon to make direct use of scientific knowledge when formulating the final 
decision”. He points out, “Resorting to science as an instrument of rationalization of the metal-juridical aspects 
of the judge’s reasoning therefore opens numerous possibilities which, although undoubtedly interesting, ne-
vertheless give rise to a great number of thorny problems concerning both the validity of the scientific know-
ledge used in the trial and extremely important issues regarding the manner in which the judge performs his 
role and works out his evaluations.”); GRECO, L. Instituições de Processo Civil (Institutions of Civil Action). v. 2. 
Rio de Janeiro: Forense Jurídica, 2010. (stating, “it is hard to see how the judge can refrain from acknowledging 
the truth revealed by the expert evidence, because the judge does not possess, or is not presumed to possess, 
the expert’s knowledge. Therein lies the great risk of expert evidence: it transforms the expert into a judge.” and 
noting that “the difficulty of understanding and evaluating highly specialized knowledge also justifies a certain 
resistance in Germany and the United States to judicial review of public policies, which are relegated to internal 
problem-solving committees of the Public Authority itself or of the regulatory agencies, or considered policy 
matters to be decided upon by the authorities themselves.”); PENALVA, E. P. Introducción al Derecho Procesal 
Penal (Introduction to Law of Criminal Procedure). 2.ed. Managua: Editorial Hispamer; 2002. (finding the dif-
ficulty of expert evidence requires the judge be more careful in establishing the grounds for his decisions, in 
such a way that the judge is not allowed to act as an expert nor the expert to act as a judge).
25  BRAZIL. National Justice Council Recommendation no. 31 of 2010. [statute on the Internet].. Retrieved 
from: <http://www.cnj.jus.br/atos-administrativos/atos-da-presidencia/322-recomendacoes-do-conselho/
12113-recomendacao-no-31-de-30-de-marco-de-2010>. Access on 2013, March 3
26  BURNHAM, W. Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States. 4.ed. City: West, 2011.
27  BURNHAM, W. Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States. 4.ed. City: West, 2011.
28  Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts of 2011, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 STAT 1926 (December 1, 
2011).
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sufficient facts or data;” (c) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 
and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.29 
As can be seen, the role of the judge in the United States with respect to admit-
ting expert testimony under FRE 702 is broad. The requirement of 702(a) is a relevancy 
requirement, but the requirements of 702(b), 702(c), and 702(d) require the judge to 
test whether the testimony offered has a reliable basis.30 Another value to this rule is 
that it addresses, at least in part, the concern that exists in Brazil as well as in the United 
States that the judge’s and trier of fact’s role will crumble in the face of expert testimony. 
The question, however, arises whether we also consider courts with a multidis-
ciplinary composition of judges. In France, the courts specializing in public healthcare 
include a medical doctor, a veterinarian and, possibly, a pharmacologist, who act as the 
judge’s permanent assistants: they are civil servants, and the medical doctor is a pub-
lic healthcare inspector who has graduated from the École des Hautes Etudes en Santé 
Publique (Higher Institute of Public Healthcare) in Rennes.31 The German example has 
aroused quite a bit of interest. In Germany, the social law judicial system, with lay judg-
es, permits judges with healthcare training to settle disputes of public healthcare law.32 
The great advantage is that, since they are actual judges rather than mere expert assis-
tants (assistant civil servants), these agents’ actions have greater legitimacy thanks to 
the guaranteed effective independence of judges. 
3. CAN THE JUDICIARY PROTECT AN INDIVIDUAL’S 
PUBLIC HEALTHCARE RIGHTS WITHOUT CONSIDERING 
OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN THE SAME SITUATION?
The existence of thousands of “healthcare law” cases indicates the extent to 
which we are faced with questions of public interest that demand suitable judicial mea-
sures.33 In fact, if we look at the main causes of such disputes, we find a single public 
healthcare authority’s action is repeatedly challenged because the widespread effect 
of its behavior does not impact one claimant alone.34 This raises the question whether 
29  Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts of 2011, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 STAT 1926 (December 1, 
2011).
30  Advisory committee’s note on Fed. R. Evid. 702, Pub.L. No. 93-595, 88 STAT 1926 (December 1, 2011).
31  Law no 2004-806 (Law of 9 August 2004) (formerly called L’École nationale de santé publique).
32  Sozialgesetzbuch, § 12, 3 [statute available on the Internet]. Retrieved from: <http://www.gesetze-im-inter-
net.de/sgg/index.html>. Access on 2010, December 31.
33  BRAZIL. National Justice Council preliminary report no. 107 of 2010 (finding here are 112, 24 judicial actions 
involving public healthcare law currently underway in the Brazilian state and federal courts). Retrieved from: 
<http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/programas/forumdasaude/relatorio_atualizado_da_resolucao107.pdf>. 
34  MANNING, S.; RADAZZO, K. Leveling the Playing Field? Litigant Success Rates in Healthcare Policy Cases in 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The Justice System Journal, v. 30, n. 2, 2009. p. 247; CHILE. Constitutional Court 
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current procedural instruments in Brazil relating to class actions are up to the task of 
handling questions of public law that affect public interests.35 
The Judiciary should follow the principle of equality before the law, ensuring 
equal treatment for everyone under its jurisdiction who is in the same factual situation. 
This principle justifies procedural instruments such as class actions, binding judicial 
precedents and model proceedings (Musterverfahren) that guide courts in resolving 
similar cases. Additionally, these procedural instruments also serve the goals of ensur-
ing broad access to justice and reducing repetitive judicial proceedings.
However, in a public law case involving an administrative authority’s acts or be-
havior, equal treatment before the law by the Judiciary is a natural consequence of the 
duty of equality. This duty of equality has always been binding on Government Agen-
cies in their substantive duties and in the extrajudicial sphere.36
It is unacceptable to impose duties on administrative authorities, which benefit 
individual claimants, without proper regard to the needs of society as a whole. There is 
no logical reason why an administrative act originally intended for society as a whole 
should benefit only litigants. Besides fragmenting and undermining the healthcare sys-
tem, this mechanism involves the risk of excluding minorities who do not have access 
to the justice system, departing from the idea of a universal and egalitarian healthcare 
system.37
Such questions should have one-time erga omnes decisions. The solution should 
not reside solely in the system of class actions. Brazil has no solid basis for a specific ju-
dicial procedure compatible with the unique nature of public law in relation to private 
law cases. Class actions– which are traditionally connected with private law – generate 
Judgment No. 976-07 of 2008; COLOMBIA. Constitutional Court Judgment no. T-760 of 2008; ARGENTINA. Bue-
nos Aires National Supreme Court, Healthcare Law of 2010; URUGUAY. Court of Appeals in Civil Matters, 2nd 
Judicial Rotation, Judgment no. 159/2008; URUGUAY. Court for Administrative Litigation, 3rd Judicial Rotation, 
Action for Amparo (constitutional relief ) IUE 2-27081/2009. 
35  PERLINGEIRO, Ricardo ERLINGEIRO Death of a Concept?,6 (December 1, 2011). Mendes da. A Impugnação 
Judicial de atos Administrativos na Defesa de Interesses Difusos, Coletivos e Individuais Homogêneos (Judicial 
challenges of administrative acts in defense of homogeneous individual, common, and collective interests). 
Congresso Colombiano de Derecho Procesal (Colombian Procedural Law Convention).Bogota: Universidad 
Libre, 2007. p. 919-938.
36  CASSAGNE, J. C. Derecho Administrativo (Administrative Law). Buenos Aires: Lexis; 2006.  (considering the 
administrative precedent to be the true source of administrative law); GARAY, A. F. La Igualdad ante la Ley 
(Equality Before the Law). Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot; 1989 (stipulating that the administrative act must be 
accompanied by a specific statement of grounds in case it ceases to follow administrative precedent).
37  SARLET, I. W.; FIGUEIREDO, M. F. Algumas Considerações Sobre o Direito Fundamental à Proteção e Pro-
moção da Saúde aos 20 Anos da Constituição Federal de 1988 (Introduction to the Law of Fundmental 
Rights and Healthcare Promotion in the 20 years of the Federal Constitution of 1988). Retrieved from: <http://
www.cnj.jus.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11691&Itemid=1225> (noting, “the resul-
ting difficulties are demonstrated in practice, especially in the borderline healthcare cases, so that the judicial 
re solution of such questions, even when attained, still has dubious, even perverse side effect, in that it safe-
guards the law solely for those who can afford access to the Judiciary.”).
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great expectations yet fail to achieve the desired effect in terms of protecting public 
rights.38
With these considerations we will venture to make a few suggestions de lege 
lata and de lege ferenda to improve the Brazilian judicial system concerning litigation of 
public healthcare disputes. We shall again use the example of a request for medication 
from the SUS.
The Federal Supreme Court has pointed out that:
the Judiciary, whose vocation is to specify a just solution for a specific case (microjustice), is 
often not in a position to examine a certain claim for a social right, to analyze the overall 
consequences of the allocation of public resources to the benefit of one party to the invariable 
detriment of the whole.39
Along the same lines, some scholars wish to exclude from individualized juridical 
proceedings, claims for new medication not included in the official lists on the grounds 
that such cases are essentially collective in nature and should be decided as such.
However, there is no clear way to deprive the citizen of the right to call upon 
the state to provide judicial services to satisfy a public right. Equally improper would 
be conditioning such services on decisions in class actions initiated by third parties. To 
deprive the citizen of access to justice and conditioning the recognition of rights upon 
third-party initiated class actions would contradict to the principle of effective judicial 
protection and of the Rule of Law.
In fact, upholding an individual’s request for the SUS to supply the claimant with 
new medication is equivalent to judicial recognition that the list of medicines should 
be modified. Such recognition is undoubtedly of general public interest. Assuming that 
the Judiciary considers it necessary to include the medication in the list, the natural 
tendency would be for the SUS not just to supply the medicine to the claimant, but 
to voluntarily promote modification of the list and make the medication available to 
everyone in the same situation. Such a measure would be an indirect consequence of 
38  The results, as was only to be expected, have not been optimal, and have created a good deal of confusion. 
GRINOVER, Ada Pelegrini; WATANABE, Kazuo; MULLENIX, Linda. Os Processos Coletivos nos Países de Civil 
Law e Common Law (Class Actions in Civil Law And Common Law Countries). São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 
2008. (discussing collective actions, which should be brought by those who are suitably representative, have 
recently featured the opt in/opt out mechanism typical of class actions. That mechanism allows a group to be 
included in or excluded from the class action). Yet how is it possible for a certain citizen or group of citizens to 
be excluded from the scope of a judicial decision which, for example, orders the Administrative Authority to 
grant benefits? Besides that, how can we reconcile individual actions with collective actions, in issues affecting 
the Public Authority which, by reason of their unity, should be decided all at once? Would conflicting decisions 
on issues arising from the same behavior threaten the structure of the Public Healthcare Authority? Law no 
7.347 of 1985 (Law of Public Civil Action). (limiting the territorial scope of judicial decisions from class actions 
to the seat of the corresponding) .Yet, how is it possible to judicially restrict administrative behaviors that are 
regional or national in scope, whose effects transcend those territorial limits?
39  Supreme Admin. Court, Decision  no. 175, 17 Mar. 2010. 
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the judicial decision. To do so, however, the socioeconomic impact and public interest 
of that measure would have to be exhaustively discussed in advance in the judicial pro-
ceedings. The need for prior exhaustive discussion is based on the fact that it is unac-
ceptable for a judge, when delivering a judgment, to ignore the indirect effects of his 
decision on other patients.
Similarly, in a lawsuit in which it was argued that the medicines Pegylated Al-
pha-2a or Alpha-2b Interferon and Ribavirin were necessary for the treatment of chronic 
hepatitis C, one of the judges of the Superior Court of Justice found that “according to 
the principles of democracy, equal treatment before the law, and the feasibility require-
ment (Vorbehalt des Möglichen), it is not a duty of the state to provide an individual ser-
vice if it could not be viably provided under equal conditions to all the other individuals 
in the same situation”.40
However, the ideal solution would require enacting a new law in Brazil. The 
better solution would be to consider the basis of the individual claims as grounds to 
suspend considerations of the merits of the individual claim and to combine the claim 
with other like claims in an action brought by an independent public body. Such review 
would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of a single court capable of issuing a decision 
with erga omnes effects, so long as the original case is suspended for a reasonable time, 
without prejudice to granting requests for urgent measures.41
4. THE RELEVANCE OF FINITE RESOURCES TO THE COURT’S 
ROLE IN RESOLVING ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE CASES?
In an individual claim to be supplied the medicine Clexane 40 mg free of charge, 
within 30 days after childbirth, the Public Healthcare Authority argued that budgetary 
constraints precluded relief in this claim, since the Public Health Authority had limited 
40  BVerfGE 33, 303-358 (the feasibility requirement can be likened to the German Vorbehalt des Möglichen, whi-
ch the German Constitutional Court has generally interpreted as meaning that the judiciary can only impose a 
duty on the state to provide services that citizens could reasonably expect of the state); BRAZIL. Higher Court 
of Justice , no. 24.197/PR, 2007/0112500-5, Mandado de Segurança (Writ of Mandamus).
41  This is one of the provisions of the Euro-American Model Administrative Jurisdiction Code prepared by 
legal scholars associated with Fluminense Federal University and the University of Administrative Sciences 
of Speyer, Germany. It also coincides in part with the text currently under discussion at the Ibero-American 
Procedural Law Institute, which appointed a special committee to prepare a Model Administrative Jurisdiction 
Code, presided over by GRINOVER, Ada Pellegrini (Código Modelo de Processos Administrativos – Judicial 
e Extrajudicial – para Ibero-América. Buenos Aires: IIDP, 2012 Aproved by the General Assembly of the Ibero-
-American Institute of Procedural Law on XXIII Session of Ibero-Americanas de Direito Processual, that occurred 
in Buenos Aires, on June  8, 2012. The Project was concluded in February of 2012 by the Revising Committee, 
which is made up by professors Ada Pellegrini Grinover, Brazil (President); Ricardo Perlingeiro, Brazil (Secretary-
General); Abel Zamorano, Panama; Adriáns Simons, Peru; Angel Landoni Sosa, Uruguay; Carlos Manuel Ferreira 
da Silva, Portugal; Euripides Cuevas, Colombia; Gumesindo García Morelos, Mexico; Ignacio M. Soba Bracesco, 
Uruguai; Juan Antonio Robles Garzón, Spain; Maria Rosa Gutiérrez Sanz, Spain; Odete Medauar, Brazil; Ruth 
Stella Correa Palacio, Colombia; Sergio Artavia Barrantes, Costa Rica.
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economic-financial capacity. It is said that public entities work with scarce resources 
and have duties to meet the needs of the entire population. The court – in accordance 
with the predominant case law accepted:
the generic assertion of budget limitations related to the feasibility requirement (Vorbe-
halt des Möglichen). However besides the fact that the non-availability of funds to meet 
the initial claim has not been specifically demonstrated, it is not sufficient to prevent the 
realization of the constitutional right under review, especially in light of the well-known 
fact that the Government has abundant allocations earmarked for far less important 
interests than the health of the population (for example, advertising, special events, etc.), 
which can and should be redirected, when necessary, to satisfy the population’s basic 
rights.
Moreover, it was affirmed that:
it is not an undue interference by the Judiciary in the sphere of action reserved to the oth-
er branches (of government) but on the contrary, positive judicial action to provide services 
based on the relevant constitutional grounds and on the illegal omission of the administrative 
authority in attending to it; especially when that authority, in concrete terms, did not present 
any grounds that prevented its accomplishment in the least.42
In fact, the lack of budgetary allocation could never interfere with the judicial 
recognition of rights to public healthcare, or even with the enforcement of sentences 
against the Public Healthcare Authority. The public budget is an essentially political in-
strument that depends on the law. Social rights, including the right to healthcare, flow 
from the Constitution or specific legislation. An administrative authority cannot deny 
the social rights established by the Constitution and legislation because of budgetary 
constraints. Both legislation and the Constitution charges the administrative authority 
with guaranteeing these rights and it would be contrary to the Rule of Law if judicial 
recognition of rights could be imagined to depend on the political intent of the Legis-
lative or Executive branches when drawing up the budget.
Consideration should, however, be made when ensuring effective enforcement 
of urgent court orders of the limited human, material or financial resources available 
to the public healthcare authority. This includes resource limitations such as: the lack 
of professional specialists, hospital beds, equipment for treatments and examinations, 
etc. Such considerations are permissible when ensuring effective enforcement of ur-
gent court orders because, in general, the judicial realization of the claimants’ rights 
must not affect the goods or services available to ensure the continuity of an essential 
42  Trial Apelreex7917-SE, 2009.85.00.001348-8, 14 Jan. 2010.
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public service. Therefore, it is necessary to seek a balance between public and private 
interests.
This idea that budgetary constraints do not excuse non-compliance with con-
stitutionally guaranteed rights is also prevalent in the United States. In Goldberg v. Kelly 
the United States Supreme Court considered whether an individual’s welfare benefits 
could be terminated without an evidentiary hearing.43 The welfare authority cited the 
excessive costs of providing evidentiary hearings as the reason for not conducting a 
pre-termination hearing.44 The Supreme Court ruled that “[w]hile the problem of addi-
tional expense must be kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the 
ordinary standards of due process.”45 The approach in Goldberg in which a constitution-
al guarantee to due process could not be overcome for budgetary reasons, matches the 
approach adopted in Brazil in which the constitutional guarantee to healthcare could 
not be overcome by budgetary constraints. A central difference is that in the United 
States there is no constitutional guarantee to healthcare as there is in Brazil. 
While the idea that budgetary constraints do not excuse non-recognition of 
constitutional rights may be obvious, there are diverging approaches on the manner 
in which rights are recognized. This is significant because diverging approached to rec-
ognition of rights can lead to different outlooks on budgetary constraints. Christopher 
Newdick compares the individual-centric and the community-centric approaches to 
rights recognition.46 
Under the individual-centric approach, rights are vested in the person and may 
be asserted just as any other right that belongs to an individual. In the community-cen-
tric approach, on the other hand, rights belong to society and the recognition of a right 
in any individual case depends on the effect of recognition on society as a whole.47 
Since rights belong to society in the community-centric approach, judicial protection 
should be afforded to guarantee that all members of society have equal opportunity to 
benefits.48 This emphasis leads to greater weight being given to judicial protection of 
procedural rights.49 Under the individual-centric approach, however, judicial protection 
43  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 256 (1970).
44  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
45  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
46  NEWDICK, C. Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding Social 
Solidarity. Common Market Law Review, v. 43, 2006, p. 1645.
47  NEWDICK, C. The European Court of Justice, Transnational Health Care, and Social Citizenship - Accidental 
Death of a Concept? Wisconsin International Law Journal, v. 26, n. 3, 2009, p. 846.
48  NEWDICK, C. The European Court of Justice, Transnational Health Care, and Social Citizenship - Accidental 
Death of a Concept? Wisconsin International Law Journal, v. 26, n. 3, 2009, p. 846.
49  NEWDICK, C. The European Court of Justice, Transnational Health Care, and Social Citizenship - Accidental 
Death of a Concept? Wisconsin International Law Journal, v. 26, n. 3, 2009, p. 846.
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is designed to guarantee “that which is properly mine.”50 This emphasis leads to greater 
weight being given to judicial protection of substantive individual rights.
Brazilian courts, as well as the ECJ, adopt the individual-centric approach and 
offers judicial protection of substantive individual rights.51 It is clear in a jurisdiction 
that offers judicial protection for individual substantive rights that budget restriction 
cannot justify denying a right that belongs to the individual. This is the situation in Bra-
zil and in the ECJ. It is equally clear that in a jurisdiction that takes a community-centric 
approach and provides judicial protection of procedural rights must take into account 
the effect that recognition of a right in an individual case has on the budget since the 
right belongs to society as whole.52 
In the procedural sphere, however, the specificity of the topic comes from the 
fact that public healthcare claims are predominantly asserted through urgent judicial 
measures (such as claims for injunctive relief ). In urgent judicial measures, judicial rec-
ognition of a substantive right and protection of that right coincide in time. This is so 
that the weighing of public versus private interests is one more prerequisite for grant-
ing the measure. Additional conditions precedents include the requirements of fumus 
boni iuris and periculum in mora.
5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
In sum:
1. The judicialization of healthcare policy is no exception to the three-branch sys-
tem of government since it is the duty of the Judiciary to protect rights by exer-
cising complete jurisdiction over the Public Healthcare Authority. This includes 
by reviewing its discretionary functions and scientific content.
2. The shortage of public funding is not an obstacle to judicial recognition of pub-
lic healthcare rights, despite material impossibility of enforcing the decision 
being considered a legitimate excuse on the part of the administrative authori-
ty. Given the lack of public resources, especially human and material resources, 
the courts must weigh public versus private interests before granting urgent 
measures concerning healthcare law.
50  NEWDICK, C. Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding Social 
Solidarity. Common Market Law Review, v. 43, 2006, p. 1645.
51  NEWDICK, C. Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding Social 
Solidarity. Common Market Law Review, v. 43, 2006, p. 1645.
52  NEWDICK, C. Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding Social 
Solidarity. Common Market Law Review, v. 43, 2006, p. 1646 (stating that “[w]ithin the constraints imposed 
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3. The creation of specialized courts might be considered, perhaps even with a 
multidisciplinary panel of judges bringing together healthcare professionals 
in order to ensure high-quality judicial services, particularly when it comes to 
administrative questions of a scientific nature.
4. The Brazilian class action system is neither adequate nor effective in protect-
ing public rights and consequently public healthcare rights. The healthcare law 
cases – if based on public policies– should provide single decisions of general 
applicability, in order to prevent the Judiciary from serving as a tool to circum-
vent the administrative authority’s duty to follow the principle of equal treat-
ment before the law.
5. A single specialized judicial body composed of multidisciplinary members may 
help safeguard the principle of equal treatment before the law while at the 
same time reducing the number of repetitive trials and improving the quality 
of judicial services in public healthcare matters. Such a body would be situated 
on the federal or State levels. The specialized body would decide on federal, 
State or municipal healthcare policies, even when individual claims only inci-
dentally imply healthcare policy questions. 
Finally, it should be noted that, except for the suggested specialization of cer-
tain judicial bodies in the healthcare field, the remaining conclusions show that the 
“judicialization of healthcare policy” and the judicial protection of public healthcare 
rights may be carried out efficiently in accordance with the fundamental principles of 
jurisdictional action vis-à-vis the public health authorities, without requiring any spe-
cial rules of procedure.
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